



GHOST



BROWSER

BROAD-SCALE ESPIONAGE
WITH BITSQUATTING

OSCAR SALAZAR | ROB RAGAN OF BISHOP FOX

WHAT IS A BIT FLIP?

When a 1 changes to a 0 or a 0 changes to a 1.

These 1's and 0's are used to represent the letters in the text we read.

This attack vector works by exploiting an opportunistic condition when these hardware failures occur.

MEMORY BEFORE

Q 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1

S 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

MEMORY AFTER


BIT
FLIP



**LOWERING
VOLTAGE**



**INCREASING
HEAT**



**COSMIC
RADIATION**

WHAT IS BIT SQUATTING?

Bitsquatting is the act of registering bit flipped variations on a target domain.

Example bitsquat domains of abc.com:

cbc.com
ebc.com
ibc.com
qbc.com
acc.com

MEMORY BEFORE

Q 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1

S 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

MEMORY AFTER


**BIT
FLIP**



**LOWERING
VOLTAGE**



**INCREASING
HEAT**




**COSMIC
RADIATION**

BITSQUAT VS. TYPOSQUAT


 TARGET KEY

 KEY AFTER FLIP OCCURS

 Typesquat vs. Bitsquat
FAT FINGER ZONE



REGISTERED 840 BITFLIPS OF **THESE DOMAINS**



REGISTERED 840 BITFLIPS OF **THESE DOMAINS**

```
sna0.com.  
googletagmanage2.com.  
localytic3.com.  
googleanalytic3.com.  
slack-msg3.com.  
nnpj3.com.  
teslamotor3.com.  
foxnew3.com.  
googleusercontent4.com.  
kaspersk9.com.  
symantea.com.  
wootria.com.  
cdn-appla.com.  
microsoftonlina.com.  
googletagmanageb.com.  
symanteb.com.  
wootrib.com.  
wootrac.com.  
localyticc.com.  
googleanalyticc.com.  
symantdc.com.  
syman4ec.com.  
symaftec.com.  
symajtec.com.  
symaltec.com.  
sy-antec.com.
```

```
: |
```

MacBook Pro

CERTIFICATES

ENCRYPTION IN TRANSIT

Cost Prohibitive (< 2015)

Encrypting data used to be expensive

Costing between \$300-\$2000 USD for wildcard certificates

3 Years	\$475 per year	(You Save 20%)	BUY OR RENEW
2 Years	\$535 per year	(You Save 10%)	BUY OR RENEW
1 Year	\$595		BUY OR RENEW

Purchasing Options

Validity Period	Price
1 Year	\$1,999
2 Year	\$3,595 Save over \$400
3 Year	\$5,095 Save over \$900

Note: All prices are in U.S. dollars.

[Buy Now](#)




CERTIFICATES FOR ALL

ENCRYPTION IN TRANSIT BECOMES FREE

LetsEncrypt (April 2016)

Certificates become free for all
(including threat actors)

All major cloud providers all
provide free certificates







HOW TO SPY ON USER ACTIVITY

- Register bit squat domains that serve common JavaScript frameworks, libraries, or analytics
- Upon request for .js files or requests with Accept headers expecting JavaScript, response with malicious JS
- Inject script that captures DOM, cookies, screenshots what the user is looking at, and gets cached

MOST POPULAR JAVASCRIPT LIBRARIES



MALICIOUS JAVASCRIPT – GOOGLE TAG MANAGER



Victim User Agent

Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 7.0; zh-cn; Mi-4c Build/NRD90M) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/53.0.2785.146 Mobile Safari/537.36
XiaoMi/MiuiBrowser/9.4.11

Cookies

JSESSIONID=56FD691E02F536D9F2A16D8B6E38F2B7; _ga=GA1.4.862001398.1550519046; _gid=GA1.4.1232071979.1554341626

DOM

```
1. <html><head><!-- Gomgle Tag Manager --><script async="" src="https://www.gomgletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-5MWDNS6"></script><script>(function(w,d,s,l,i)+
w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!=='dataLayer'?'+l: '';j.async=t
ps://www.gomgletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-5MWDNS6');</script><!-- End Gomg
--><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,user-scalable=no,initial-scale=1,maximum-scale=1,minimum-scale=1"><title>Subscri
title><link href="./static/css/failed_default.4f492e7167bd7ae4a66658be22aacf22.css" rel="stylesheet"><style type="text/css"></style></head> <body style="d
><!-- Gomgle Tag Manager (noscript) --><noscript><iframe src="https://www.gomgletagmanager.com/ns.html?id=GTM-5MWDNS6"height="0" width="0" style="display:n
:hidden"></iframe></noscript><!-- End Gomgle Tag Manager (noscript) --><header></div><p id="bannertext" class="header-txt">
```

MALICIOUS JAVASCRIPT – GOOGLE TAG MANAGER

Vulnerable Page URL

<http://mgame.robi.com.bd/LPBase/lqy934/>


Execution Origin

<http://mgame.robi.com.bd>

User IP Address

202.134.9.132

Location For IP: 202.134.9.132

Continent:	Asia (AS)
Country:	Bangladesh  (BD)
Capital:	Dhaka
State:	Dhaka
City Location:	Dhaka
Postal:	1204
ISP:	AXIATA Bangladesh (Robi)
Organization:	TM International Bangladesh
AS Number:	AS24432 TM International Bangladesh Ltd.

MALICIOUS JAVASCRIPT INJECTION

GOOGLE TAG MANAGER

Referer

```
http://ptldgame.robi.com.bd/0009Fw?tid=015ca55fde007e2ed48&offer_id=130&sub_affid=45
```

Victim User Agent

```
Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 7.0; zh-cn; Mi-4c Build/NRD90M) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome  
XiaoMi/MiuiBrowser/9.4.11
```

Cookies

```
JSESSIONID=56FD691E02F536D9F2A16D8B6E38F2B7; _ga=GA1.4.862001398.1550519046; _gid=GA1.4.1232071979.1554341626
```




MALICIOUS JAVASCRIPT INJECTION

GOOGLE TAG MANAGER

ع EN

 **ELEVAY**
EXPANDING YOUR FREEDOM




برنامج تأشيرة UK TIER 1
يسمح برنامج UK Tier 1 للأفراد بالحصول على الإقامة في المملكة المتحدة في

213.186.182.67

<https://www.elevay.com/ar/info/uk-tier-1-visa/?ut...>

Location For IP: 213.186.182.67

Continent:	Asia (AS)
Country:	Jordan  (JO)
Capital:	Amman
State:	Al Balqa'
City Location:	Amman
ISP:	Jordan Data Communications Company LLC
Organization:	Jordan Data Communications Company LLC
AS Number:	AS8376 Jordan Data Communications Company LLC

 View Full Report

 Resend Email Report

 Delete

Victim User Agent

Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 12_1_4 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/12.0 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1

Cookies



MXCookie=; ORG1188=25b11841-c4f7-4b60-bdf9-d7414b48b4ef; PHPSESSID=baj705gddjdsbd7ksfk2tie4e5

DOM

```
1. <html data-whatinput="touch" data-whatintent="touch" class=" whatinput-types-initial whatinput-types-touch"><head>
2.     <!-- Google Tag Manager -->
3.     <script type="text/javascript" async="" src="https://cdn.livechatinc.com/tracking.js"></script><script async="" src="https://www.googletaganager.com/gtm.js?id=G
4.     TM-NL6PHNS"></script><script>(function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':
5.     new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],
6.     j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src=
7.     'https://www.googletaganager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);
8.     })(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-NL6PHNS');</script>
9.     <!-- End Google Tag Manager -->
10.     <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
11.
12.     =====
13.     Mobile Specific Metas
14.     =====
15.     -->
16.     <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, maximum-scale=1">
17.
18.
19.
```

MALICIOUS JAVASCRIPT INJECTION

GOOGLE TAG MANAGER

Thumbnail	Victim IP	Vulnerable Page URI	Options
	27.92.54.4	https://swallows-crew.flpjp.com/mypage	View Full Report Resend Email Report Delete
	114.142.249.79	https://pipahdpewavin.blogspot.com/2012/04/war...	View Full Report Resend Email Report Delete

An abstract graphic of a circuit board with various lines, nodes, and components in shades of blue and white, set against a dark purple background.

HOW TO STEAL **PASSWORDS**


AUTHENTICATION DOMAINS

MICROSOFTONLINE BITFLIPS

Single Sign-On (SSO) Abuse

Intercepted dozens of password resets and login attempts per week

Captured usernames, passwords, and phone numbers used during authentication



Victim: NYC.gov via Microsoft SSO



POST / HTTP/1.1

Host: passwordreset.microsoftonline.com

Accept: */*

Content-Length: 4793

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8

Cookie: CookiesSupportedCookie=True;

ASP.NET_SessionId=jt40orkjm0ldpjyp43rsuegw; flt=Iris; BannerLogoUrl=;

SessionId=sonjsyvgeosmktykrnwhubqd;

TrackingId=1d9f3b0095ce4f9ba081e1e69af3a0ff;

WorkflowConsistencyCheck=636892859846146778; x-ms-gateway-dc=EUS; x-ms-gateway-env=PROD; x-ms-gateway-su=a

Origin: https://passwordreset.microsoftonline.com

Referer: https://passwordreset.microsoftonline.com/

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.86 Safari/537.36

X-Microsoftajax: Delta=true

X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest

Victim: NYC.gov via Microsoft SSO



```
ctl00$ScriptManagerMain=ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$updatePanelMain|ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$ButtonNext
__LASTFOCUS=
__EVENTTARGET=ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$ButtonNext
__EVENTARGUMENT=
__VIEWSTATE=...snippet...
__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR=CA0B0334
__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED=
__EVENTVALIDATION=...snippet...
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$TextBoxPassword1=E--REDACTED--!
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$TextBoxPassword2=E--REDACTED--!
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$CurrentViewName=ViewNewPassword
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$LiveCaptchaMode=Image
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$WorkflowConsistencyCheck=636892855503065182
ctl00$CorrelationID=0c79cd97-4f64-4cb3-858d-df668335eb25
ctl00$OrgIdUserName=REDACTED@health.nyc.gov
ctl00$OrgIdTenantDomain=
ctl00$NameCoexistenceAccount=
__ASYNCPOST=true
```


Victim: Dialog.lk via Microsoft SSO



POST / HTTP/1.1

Host: passwordreset.microsoftonline.com

Content-Length: 1901

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8

Cookie: flt=Iris; CookiesSupportedCookie=True;

SessionId=v4habso3dvjg0foiadx1nb4i;

TrackingId=77ccd32b142b4243910076d17437613c;

ASP.NET_SessionId=htcwq3sm1u4pelut0iexsb3c; x-ms-gateway-dc=EUS; x-ms-gateway-env=PROD; x-ms-gateway-su=a;

BannerLogoUrl=https://secure.aadcdn.microsoftonline-p.com/dbd5a2dd-hdbnknj009h4yrwi9fy38-

8bdayuif3v916ej4vhk/logintenantbranding/0/bannerlogo?ts=636066981069285032;

WorkflowConsistencyCheck=636898716470456523

Origin: https://passwordreset.microsoftonline.com

Referer: https://passwordreset.microsoftonline.com/

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)

Chrome/72.0.3626.121 Safari/537.36

Via: HTTPS/1.1 proxy.dialog.dialoggsm.com AC161E19

X-Microsoftajax: Delta=true

X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest

Victim: Dialog.lk via Microsoft SSO



```
ctl00$ScriptManagerMain=ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$updatePanelMain|ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$ButtonNext
__EVENTTARGET=ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$ButtonNext
__VIEWSTATE=...snippet...
__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR=CA0B0334
__EVENTVALIDATION=...snippet...
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$TextBoxPassword1=S--REDACTED--9
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$TextBoxPassword2=S--REDACTED--9
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$CurrentViewName=ViewNewPassword
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$LiveCaptchaMode=Image
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$WorkflowConsistencyCheck=636898716470456523
ctl00$CorrelationID=77ccd32b-142b-4243-9100-76d17437613c
ctl00$OrgIdUserName=REDACTED@dialog.lk
ctl00$OrgIdTenantDomain=
ctl00$NameCoexistenceAccount=
__ASYNCPOST=true
```

Victim: SCC via Microsoft SSO



POST / HTTP/1.1

Host: passwordreset.microsoftonline.com

Content-Length: 2622

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Cookie: flt=Iris; CookiesSupportedCookie=True;

SessionId=zepksk0joi3epee2ez353h3b;

TrackingId=5a5ce80770814f6bacb465a77c50d4e4;

ASP.NET_SessionId=ondfuinlf5xmeh2f4omzdm5w; x-ms-gateway-dc=EUS; x-ms-gateway-env=PROD; x-ms-gateway-su=b; BannerLogoUrl=;

WorkflowConsistencyCheck=636903074814782645

Origin: https://passwordreset.microsoftonline.com

Referer: https://passwordreset.microsoftonline.com/

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/72.0.3626.121 Safari/537.36

Victim: SCC via Microsoft SSO



```
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$MultigateAuthenticationControl_Instance$PhoneGateControl_Office$PhoneGateControl_PhoneNumberValidationBox=--REDACTED--2452
...snippet...
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$CurrentViewName=ViewMultigateUserControl
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$LiveCaptchaMode=Image
ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$WorkflowConsistencyCheck=636903074814782645
ctl00$CorrelationID=5a5ce807-7081-4f6b-acb4-65a77c50d4e4
ctl00$OrgIdUserName=REDACTED@fr.scc.com
ctl00$OrgIdTenantDomain=
ctl00$NameCoexistenceAccount=
__EVENTTARGET=ctl00$ContentPlaceholderMainContent$MultigateAuthenticationControl_Instance$PhoneGateControl_Office$PhoneGateControl_ButtonSend
```

Victim: Shell via Microsoft SSO



```
GET /db1e96a8-a3da-442a-930b-235cac24cd5c/oauth2/authorize?client_id=b8870aea-69be-41ab-9597-20ea98f260af&redirect_uri=https%3a%2f%2fhub.shell.com%2f&response_mode=form_post&response_type=code+id_token&scope=openid+profile+email&state=OpenIdConnect.AuthenticationProperties%3doa7JrwOKyMd70zDdc7GC6h5WQXQS6oU9UVgoPf8KqDu-9wXcmXbWGPux_4LegyVzxrcWTwBovONc0emBuC3tMFWCuLgNpjrLGZWUveUYcsfTp0J5QbFCwKp93ZAMb_mWTigJUx1MoJv_-0noaZGNdG7ExFyA2g3Zz7nHfs7GMWe4whMID5Fs2M3o-1xZEEwmEVKI04zMpkP217sXPCdWBXk5vMOSvZJfj2JCbvWyBsbPET_WZ1_EQNIEkMrjInot&nonce=636894866829597824.YzI5MzNhYWQtOTkwOS00Njg1LWlXmZAtZDRlNDc0YjIwYzgwYjY1ZDMxZmMtNjUyZi00NTdiLTgxZTMtNjBiZmY4YzZmMTI3 HTTP/1.1
Host: login.microsoftonline.com
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3
Cookie: _sm_au=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.86 Safari/537.36
X-Forwarded-For: 134.163.57.49, 165.225.35.5
```

Victim: YouTube via Google APIs



POST /youtubei/v1/log_event?key=AIzaSyB-63vPrdThhKuerbB2N_17Kwwcxj6yUAc
HTTP/1.1

Host: **yn**utubei.**f**oogleapis.com

Accept-Language: da-dk

Authorization: **Bearer** ya29.GtUB3AbMdUNuIQyxCqjffE8WlEW4WqU-REDACTED-
cvsA0ite3GfoDM

Content-Length: 8308

Content-Type: application/x-protobuf

User-Agent: com.google.ios.youtube/14.11.8 (iPhone7,2; U; CPU iOS 12_1_2 like
Mac OS X; da_DK)

X-Forwarded-For: 85.202.21.158

X-Goog-API-Format-Version: 2

X-Goog-Device-Auth:

device_id=AEQ63XEPeR4HzUJzF+T9dT8g++7NidXjZ8FYx15gN8Qv29Lt8psyt1G+9aQn/SDGSKRw
iBnzCZEtCypdg1SigmRyh5yfrgwbQUimgkft388Pe1hOB9T3xQap1UUEUx3iIaMzCZFMLUdEQ,data=
AFjJpFR6R7+n,content=AFjJpFTPjcPtqqqoMiDdxzHJmQm5iT3JMw

X-Goog-Visitor-Id: Cgt5dERMa1BhQWpJMCik1vnkBQ%3D%3D

A decorative graphic on the left side of the slide, consisting of a complex network of thin, light blue lines and dots, resembling a circuit board or a data network. The lines are of varying thickness and connect various points, some of which are marked with small circles or squares.

HOW TO GET **RCE**


Victim: Install via Github




...

<http://raw.githubusercontent.com/Angristan/OpenVPN-install/master/openvpn-install.sh>
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/elk-test/master/securityonion_elsa2elk.sh
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kada115/bukan-untuk-umum/master/instatools.sh>
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/alexa/avs-devive-sdk/master/tools/Install/pi.sh>
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/diyhue/diyHue/master/BridgeEmulator/easy_install.sh
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/docker-32bits/ubuntu/master/buildimage.sh>
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Hax4us/metasploit_termux/master/metasploit.sh
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jedom/core/master/install.sh>
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MichMich/MagicMirror/master/installers/raspberry.sh>
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Zer0CoolX/guacamole-install-rhel/master/guac-install.sh>
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/creationix/nvm/v0.34.0/install.sh>
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/robbyrussell/oh-my-zsh/master/tools/install.sh>
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/alexa/avs-devive-sdk/master/tools/Install/setup.sh>
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/master/install>
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/master/install>
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/master/install>


GITHUBUSERCONTENT.COM DIRECTLY TO RCE



GITHUBUSERCONTENT.COM DIRECTLY TO RCE



GITHUBUSERCONTENT.COM DIRECTLY TO RCE




An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in shades of blue and white, located in the top-left corner of the slide.

OBSERVATIONS
**WHAT DID
WE SEE?**


WHERE THIS IS HAPPENING



USER-AGENTS OBSERVED



MOBILE
USER-AGENTS
OBSERVED



An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in shades of blue and white, located in the top-left corner of the slide.

OBSERVATIONS
**WHO ELSE IS
LISTENING?**


MONITORING BITFLIPS

CONTINUOUSLY INSPECT SERVICES

Subdomain discovery

Service discovery (HTTPS,
SMTP, DNS)

Captured screenshot of
application




MONITORING BITFLIPS

CONTINUOUSLY INSPECT SERVICES


Malicious Chrome Extensions

Requests permission to all sensitive content


Compromise all of clients traffic



BITFLIP REGISTERED SATURATION



HTTPS ON REGISTERED BITFLIP DOMAINS



An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in shades of blue and white, located in the top-left corner of the page. It features various lines, nodes, and components typical of a PCB layout.

RECOMMENDATIONS & MITIGATIONS **DEFENSE TACTICS**

DEFENSIVE DOMAIN REGISTRATION

STOP BIT SQUATTERS

Register All Bitflip Variations

Seize control of domains once others are listening

```
~ bf-lookup amazon.com
cmazon.com ns1.above.com,ns2.above.com
emazon.com ns1.markmonitor.com,ns3.markmonitor.com,ns4.markmonitor.c
imazon.com ns1.parkingcrew.net,ns2.parkingcrew.net
qamazon.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
alazon.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
aoazon.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
aiazon.com ns77.domaincontrol.com,ns78.domaincontrol.com
aeazon.com dns1.registrar-servers.com,dns2.registrar-servers.com
a-azon.com ns07.domaincontrol.com,ns08.domaincontrol.com
amczon.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
amezon.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
amizon.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
amqzon.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
amaxon.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
amaron.com ns61.worldnic.com,ns62.worldnic.com
amajon.com ns1.parkingspa.com,ns2.parkingspa.com
amaznn.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
amazmn.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
amazkn.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
amazgn.com ns1.myhostadmin.net,ns2.myhostadmin.net,ns3.myhostadmin.n
amazoo.com ns1.westservers.net,ns2.westservers.net
amazol.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
amazoj.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
amazof.com ns-1.amazon.com,ns-2.amazon.com,ns-3.amazon.com
amazo..com *
```




CERTIFICATE TRANSPERENCY


MONITOR CTL FOR WILDCARD CERTIFICATES

Malicious CTL Activity

Indicates threat is planning to intercept sensitive traffic

Set alerts for domains you rely on for secure communication





RESPONSE POLICY ZONE (RPZ)

CONTROL DNS RESPONSES

- DNS filtering to override global resolutions and control what your systems can access
- Generate a list of bitflips that you want to ensure resolve to the correct site and apply that ruleset to your organizations DNS resolvers
- Rewrite responses to send users to a walled garden

Victim: Every 20 minutes...

POST /Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync?jAkHBBA22TTYxUdjsTN/vFqGT1aWBAAAAACV1A=
HTTP/1.1

Host: apidat.googleusercontent.com

Authorization: RPSToken

t=EwAgA91JBAAUXVHTgKyJm1pMwJWonrGcwEzI3LwAAUPhkqiHOGW7gMuZjvEnv+OjIsmNjNC17G1gh
oWxYkSkWH3n757kphPuxeERn...snippet.../u360J2QCp97zpI6avas6VScgG0i19keW8e38Rb8FF7ej1
nN0bcTFMpYILg9DnFqzI5A32N3oXUirXauGREN1m4UC15JA3Zh1nSBEupUtBGU1oR8qATi2IXd1IuaI
OXt44MkPohpQbvULEeDsYyMeKC9G5xbI6ejWAssQfr5KgI=&p=

Content-Length: 64

Content-Type: application/vnd.ms-sync

Pragma: no-cache

X-Forwarded-For: 109.42.2.6

X-Ms-Wl: WindowsPhone/8.0

X-Wlas-Tracing: true

jVR2◆EFGSIDFGDomainIdFGInternalFolderType

Victim: Every 20 minutes...

OPTIONS /Microsoft-Server-

ActiveSync?User=**lenzthomas161**&DeviceId=36D934D8C54763B1337FBC5A864F5696&DeviceType=WP HTTP/1.1

Host: apidat.googleusercontent.com

Authorization: RPSToken

t=EwAgA91JBAAUXVHTgKyJm1pMwJWonrGcwEzI3LwAAUPhkqiHOGW7gMuZjvEnv+OjIsmNjNC17GlghoWxYkSkWH3n757kphPuxeERn...snippet.../u360J2QCp97zpI6avas6VScgG0i19keW8e38Rb8FF7ej1nN0bcTFMpYILg9DnFqzI5A32N3oXUirXauGREN1m4UC15JA3Zh1nSBEupUtBGU1oR8qATi2IXd1IuaIOXt44MkPohpQbvULEeDsYyMeKC9G5xbI6ejWAssQfr5KgI=&p=

Cache-Control: no-cache

Ms-Asprotocolversion: 14.0

Pragma: no-cache

User-Agent: MSFT-WP/8.10.14219

X-Forwarded-For: 109.42.2.6

X-Ms-Wl: **WindowsPhone**/8.0

X-Wlas-Tracing: true

Calendar Sync: Every 30 minutes...

PROPFIND /caldav/v2/**biancabonvivant**%40gmail.com/user HTTP/1.1

Host: apidata.googleusercontent.com

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Authorization: Bearer ya29.GmXlBuDism5sXX_--REDACTED--

oUy6aLVnaorcW8ZfEcxIRHOLVfrw

Cache-Control: no-cache

Content-Length: 144

Content-Type: text/xml

Depth: 0

Pragma: no-cache

User-Agent: **MSFT-WIN-3**/10.0.17134 (gzip)

X-Forwarded-For: 173.174.51.65

X-Forwarded-Port: 443

X-Forwarded-Proto: https

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><propfind xmlns="DAV:"><prop><calendar-home-set xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:caldav" /></prop></propfind>
```

PREVIOUS BIT FLIP RESEARCH

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

DEF CON 23 - Luke Young - Investigating the Practicality and Cost of Abusing Memory Errors

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4b5disac9g4>

Defcon 21 - Jaeson Schultz - Examining the Bitsquatting Attack Surface

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IhwE1S4x36s>

DEFCON 19 – Artem Dinnaberg - Bit-squatting: DNS Hijacking Without Exploitation

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aT7mnSstKGs>

Michael Brooks – Starnoise Research Project - rewirethe.net



QUESTIONS