

ADVERSARY SINULATION

PRESENTED NOVEMBER 6, 2018







HOW DO WE FIX THIS COMPLICATION BEING REACTIVE VERSUS PROACTIVE

HOW CAN WE IMPROVE SECURITY POSTURE?

SIMULATING AN ADERSARY TO IMPROVE SECURITY POSTURE

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THIS IS HOW YOU'LL BE HACKED

From an **offensive** perspective, every "security incident" reveals an **attack roadmap**.









PLI TECHNOLOGIES





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IMPACT // ATTACK YAHOO! SPEAR PHISHING & CYBER KILL CHAIN

ATTACK

- Spear Phishing
- Poor Network Security

IMPACT

- 3 Billion Records (PII)
- Verizon Acquisition = (\$350 Million)



AND IT ALL STARTED WITH A MISCONFIGURATION

IN FACT, THE IRANIANS USED GOOGLE TO IDENTIFY THE WEBSITE THE CIA WAS USING TO COMMUNICATE WITH AGENTS. "IT WAS NEVER MEANT TO BE USED LONG TERM FOR PEOPLE TO TALK TO SOURCES. THE ISSUE WAS THAT IT WAS WORKING WELL FOR TOO LONG, WITH TOO MANY PEOPLE. BUT IT WAS AN ELEMENTARY SYSTEM."

- Former U.S. official

"YOU START THINKING TWICE ABOUT PEOPLE, FROM CHINA TO RUSSIA TO IRAN TO NORTH KOREA," SAID THE FORMER SENIOR OFFICIAL. THE CIA WAS WORRIED ABOUT ITS NETWORK "TOTALLY UNWINDING WORLDWIDE."

INSECURE APPLICATION FACEBOOK IMAGEMAGICK // IMAGETRAJIK

FAILURED TO PATCH KNOWN IMAGEMAGICK FLAW FOR MONTHS





From a **defender's** perspective, every "security incident" reveals an **opportunity to improve**.



THINGS HACKERS DON'T CARE ABOUT COMMON EXCUSES FOR LACK OF SECURITY

• The project scope

- It's managed by a third party
- It's a legacy system
- It's too "critical to patch"
- About your budget
- Non-Disclosure Agreements
- It's an internal system

- It's handled in the cloud
- About your Risk Register Entry

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- It's an interim solution
- Other **priorities**
- No "return on investment"
- You contracted out that risk
- It's **encrypted** on disk

EXTERNAL THREAT // NATION STATE	Economic, Political, Military, Espionage, and Influence	Trade Secrets, Sensitive Business Information, Critical Infrastructure	DATA BREACH VERIZON RESPONSE REPORT
EXTERNAL THREAT // DRGANIZED CRIME	Financial	Financial Systems, Personal Identifiable Information (Pii), Payment Card Information and Protected Healthcare Info (Phi)	EXTERNAL INTERNAL
EXTERNAL THREAT // HACKTIVIST MOTIVATED	Reputation or Social	Corporations, Government, High Profile Individuals	HACKING MALWARE
INTERNAL THREAT // INSIDER DRIVEN	Financial, Professional Revenge, Political	Intellectual Property, Corporations, Government	
	MOTIVES	TARGETS	ERROR SOCIAL

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IMPACT // ATTACK EQUIFAX MISSING PATCH

ATTACK

• Application Security

IMPACT

- 145.5 Million (PII)
- \$439 Million Total Cost of Breach



HOW ATTACKERS EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES IN THE 2017 BREACH BASED ON EQUIFAX INFORMATION



SOLUTION

THREE NOTIONS SHOULD GUIDE THE POSITIONING AND IDENTITY OF A SUCCESSFUL RED TEAM





The structure of the red team relative to the targeted institution The scope of activities that it pursues

The sensitivity with which it operates and provides its findings and recommendations

HOW



QUESTIONS TO ASKA RED TEAM BEFORE YOU START

- What is the red team intended to do?
- Do we have executive buy in?
- What is the scope of activities we should pursue?
- Who or what is to be red teamed?
- For how long?

- What degree of flexibility?
- To what end?
- Are there any sensitive aspects of the red team targets?
- Define all the "What if?" scenarios.