

# DEVELOPING AND TESTING AN EFFECTIVE INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN

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# Agenda: What You'll Learn Today!

1. What frameworks can you use?

2. What should you include?

3. How do you test it?

4. How do you measure its effectiveness?



#### Andy Jordan

- Senior Security Associate
- Helps manage Bishop Fox's consulting practice
- Began career in IT Infrastructure







# WHAT FRAMEWORK SHOULD YOU USE?

KARN

FWELSTORE

## Which Framework Do I Use?

SO MANY TO CHOOSE FROM



National Institute of Standards and Technology



## Lockheed Martin - Cyber Kill Chain

"KNOW YOUR ENEMY" - SUN TZU



#### Pros

- Attack Centric
- Focused on Prevention
- "Bottom-Up" Approach

#### Cons

- Requires Threat Management
- Not A Process
- Not Aligned to Overall Strategy
- No Steps for Recovery

# NIST – CyberSecurity Framework



#### Pros

- Easy to Explain
- More Defined
- Improvements Can Be Modular
- "Top-Down" Approach

#### Cons

- Needs Departmental Adoption
- Could Become A Checklist

## SANS - Incident Response Process

INCIDENT RESPONSE IS A LIFECYCLE



# WHAT SHOULD AN INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN INCLUDE?

# "Hey Andy, I Found This Weird Image On My Server"

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## Who Do I Need To Contact?

PAY NO ATTENTION TO THE BLAZING FIRE BEHIND YOU

#### Sample Incident Handling Pro

#### **1.0 INTRODUCTION**

This document provides some general guidelines and procedure document is meant to provide <COMPANY NAME> support p discover a security incident. The term incident in this document occurs on any part of the NPSN. Some examples of possible inc integrity; denial of system resources; illegal access to a system of system resources, or any kind of damage to a system. Some p

- \* You see a strange process running and accumulating
- \* You have discovered an intruder logged into your sy
- \* You have discovered a virus has infected your syster
- \* You have determined that someone from a remote si

The steps involved in handling a security incident are categorize identification of the problem; containment of the problem; eradi and the follow-up analysis. The actions taken in some of these s and are discussed in section 2. Section 3 discusses specific proc hacker/cracker incidents.

#### 1.1 TERMS

Some terms used in this document are:

- ISO Installation Security Officer
- CSO Computer Security Officer
- CSA Computer Security Analyst
- LSA Lead System Analyst
- CERT Computer Emergency Response Team
- CIAC Computer Incident Advisory Capability

#### 1.2 AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

In many cases, the actions outlined in this guideline will not Many people may be involved <u>during the course of an ac</u> <COMPANY NAME> systems at one time (i.e., a worm attack involved in the investigation of any security incident.

The <COMPANY NAME> ISO (put name here), the <CC <COMPANY NAME> CSA (put name here) will act as the incidents. In minor incidents, only the CSA will be involved, involved in the coordination effort. The incident coordination t on specific tasks of the incident handling process and will e people involved in the incident response and clean-up are re members of the incident coordination team.

Any directives given by a member of the incident coordination 1.3 IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS



day or night. Although most hacker/cracker incidents occur nanagers to be watching their flocks. However, worm and time and distance considerations in responding to the list to be notified can not respond within a reasonable time to the first. It will be the responsibility of the people on the able time frame.

from the media obtains knowledge about a security om a site currently responding to the incident. Providing ide effects. Section 2.3 discusses the policy on release of

l types of security incidents.

ventually involve federal authorities and the possibility of a ident are not always known at the beginning of, or even og should be kept for all security incidents that are under cation that can not be altered by others. Manually written leted. The types of information that should be logged are:

were discovered or occurred.

- ated tasks.
- ou.

have been affected.

e. There are some actions that can only be authorized by AME> also has the responsibility to inform <u>other sites</u> ts is provided below. Section 3 discusses who should be

n the <COMPANY NAME> Operations Manual in the room analysts can be of help when trying to contact the

Contacts

<COMPANY NAME> CSA -



- Quickly contact the CIRT.
- Follow action plans (and sub-plans).
- Update your Incident Response Plan often.

# An Example of the Good

Preparation	Identification 2	Containment
<ul> <li>Define actors, for each entity, who will be involved into the crisis cell. These actors should be documented in a contact list kept permanently up to date.</li> <li>Make sure that analysis tools are up, functional (Antivirus, IDS, logs analysers), not compromised, and up to date.</li> <li>Make sure to have architecture map of your networks.</li> <li>Make sure that an up to date inventory of the assets is available.</li> <li>Perform a continuous security watch and inform the people in charge of security about the threat trends.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Detect the infection</li> <li>Information coming from several sources should be gathered and analyzed:</li> <li>Antivirus logs,</li> <li>Intrusion Detection Systems,</li> <li>Suspicious connection attempts on servers,</li> <li>High amount of accounts locked,</li> <li>Suspicious connection attempts in firewalls,</li> <li>High increase of support calls,</li> <li>High load or system freeze,</li> <li>High volumes of e-mail sent</li> <li>If one or several of these symptoms have been spotted, the actors defined in the "preparation" step will get in touch and if necessary, create a crisis cell.</li> <li>Identify the infection</li> <li>Analyze the symptoms to identify the worm, its propagation vectors and countermeasures.</li> <li>Leads can be found from :</li> <li>CERT's bulletins;</li> <li>External support contacts (antivirus companies, etc.);</li> <li>Security websites (Secunia, SecurityFocus etc.)</li> <li>Notify Chief Information Security Officer. Contact your CERT if required.</li> <li>Assess the perimeter of the infection (i.e.: global infection, bounded to a subsidiary, etc.).</li> <li>If possible, identify the business impact of the infection.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The following actions should be performed and monitored by the crisis management cell:</li> <li>1. Disconnect the infected area from the Internet.</li> <li>2. Isolate the infected area. Disconnect it from any network.</li> <li>3. If business-critical traffic cannot be disconnected, allow it after ensuring that cannot be an infection vector or find validate circumventions techniques.</li> <li>4. Neutralize the propagation vectors. A propagation vector can be anything from network traffic to software flaw. Relevan countermeasures have to be applied (patch traffic blocking, disable devices, etc.) For example, the following techniques can be used: <ul> <li>Patch deployment tools (WSUS),</li> <li>Windows GPO,</li> <li>Firewall rules,</li> <li>Operational procedures.</li> </ul> </li> <li>5. Repeat steps 2 to 4 on each sub-area of the infected area until the worm stops spreading. possible, monitor the infection using analysi tools (antivirus console, server logs, suppor calls).</li> <li>The spreading of the worm must be monitored.</li> </ul> Mobile devices Make sure that no laptop, PDA or mobile storagic can be used as a propagation vector by the worm if possible, block all their connections.

## An Example of the Good

SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - WORMS



# HOW DO YOU TEST YOUR INCIDENT RESPONSE PLA

## **Reviewing Previous Incidents**

EXAMPLE FROM WANNACRYPT RANSOMWARE



## **Digging Through Threat Data**

EXAMPLE OF BLACK-MARKET CREDENTIAL SALES



An account with \$3,000 in funds sells for \$18

## Make Your Incident Tabletops More Realistic

LET'S PLAY A GAME!

 $\mathbf{F}$ 



#### **Red Team Testing** STOPPING AN ACTIVE ATTACK IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT Physical Pen Testing $(\mathbf{1})$ Wireless Social Engineering Pen Testing 000 Technical \$ Controls ::::: **External Pen Testing** Review Policy and Review **Internal Pen Testing** Process

# HOW DO YOU MEASURE YOUR INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN?

## Example Dashboard – "How Much Fuel Do I Have?"

WOULD YOU DRIVE THIS CAR?



## **Example Dashboard**

IT'S PRETTY HUH?

#### **Vulnerability Management Dashboard** ACCOUNTABILITY **INCREASED THROUGH OWNERSHIP VISIBILITY** TRACK **OUTSTANDING** Age Selection **Department: System Engineering** Filters 0-30 30-60 61-90 91-180 180 Quick Asset Dropdown **OR REMEDIATED** Director: Employee One; Technical Point of Contact: Employee Two Asset Groups: Dynamic, Servers, Last Updated - 41 minutes ago 1 2 3 4 Asset Groups Dropdown **ISSUES** Severity Selection **Quick Statistics Remediation Age Vulnerability Data** Compliance 40% IP DNS os Age Severity 3 Severity 4 Severity 5 Score Severity 5 10.2381 10.62.11.249 SFO0A131.ACME.COM Windows Server 2003 14,715 0-30 102 SERVIES.ACME.COM 9,217,939 10.64.208.151 Windows NT 391 Severity 4 2,038 31-60 10.68.102.128 SFO0IS25.ACME.COM Windows Server 2008 5,719 Severity 3 1.028 61-90 390 193 10.62.82.19 SFO0A339.ACME.COM Unknown 2,948 **Total Live Hosts** 100 91-180 2,019 10.61.20.83 SEO0S86-OLD ACME COM Windows Server 2012 41 Authenticating Hosts 80 (80%) 181+ 19,327 172.16.100.2 SF00S94-OLD.ACME.COM Cisco IOS 12.X 193 50 Workstations **Exceptions** 106.182.79.3 SF00S95-OLD.ACME.COM Windows Server 2000 1.093.854 50 Servers ARZ0F82.ACME.COM 103 10.28.197.1 Linux 2.6 HOST EXPIRATION SERVICES.ACME.COM Most Vulnerable Host 67.29.211.97 LAS0F1 MOC Windows 7 Enterprise 937 SFO0A4.ACME.COM November 11th 2015 Most Common Issue 18363 - Outdated Java 7 **MOVING CURSOR** 73.4.1.21 159 **SELECT A HOST TO** ernrise AZ0AB.ACME.COM December 3rd 2015 **OVER CHART REVEALS OPEN A DIRECT LINK Vulnerability Age** MORE DETAILED TO THE ASSET 1000 800 **INFORMATION** 600 400 200 July 1 July 5 July 15 July 20 August 1 August 5 September 3 September 9 September 13 September 16 September 30

#### **Report Example 1 – Security Visibility** CURRENT STATE





#### **Report Example 1 – Security Visibility** RECOMMENDED STATE

#### **Business Critical Systems Visibility Percentage Visibility**





# Report Example 2 – Security Incidents by Type

## Infection Vector





## Report Example 2 – Security Incidents by Type

#### Previous Month Compromise Vector Breakdown





## **Popular SOC Metrics**

1. Total Time to Respond

- Aggregate for All SOC Analysts (8-Weeks Rolling)
- 2. Visibility Matrix
  - Percentage of Total Devices Compared to Actual Devices Monitored

#### 3. Resolved Security Incidents

- Count by Month (13-Months Rolling)
- Count by Category (8-Weeks Rolling)

#### 4. Capacity Model

• Alert Volume Average by Hour each day *(8-Weeks Rolling)* 

## Other Questions to Ask Along The Way

IT'S ABOUT THE JOURNEY

- Were you able to close down other attack vectors?
- What improvements can you make to the plan?
- What types of security awareness can be communicated to the organization?



# HOW DO WE BRING THIS ALL TOGETHER?

#### The Key Takeaways DOES YOUR INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN SINK OR SWIM?

1. You want to use a framework that works for your organization

2. You want your Incident Response Plan to be usable

3. You want sub-plans that are customized for how you realistically handle situations

4. You should have metrics that answer questions, not create more problems

### **Thank You**





## Attributions (Images in Slides)

**Beach View Grand Theft Auto** Mountaintop Skull **Construction Fighter Photographers Street Signs Magnifying Glass** Error Notice **Shredded Receipts** <u>Tunnel</u> **Dog Graphic** Car Dash <u>Horcruxes</u> <u>Mario</u>

